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NOTES 
BACK TO THE DRAWING BOARD:  
REVISITING THE SUPREME COURT’S STANCE 
ON PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING 
Robert Colton* 
 
In the United States, state legislatures have drawn voting districts to 
achieve desired election results for hundreds of years.  Dating back to the 
James Madison presidency, various legislatures and iterations of the U.S. 
Supreme Court have wrestled with the legal and constitutional issues that 
stem from the practice known as “gerrymandering.”  While courts and 
legislatures have, at times, been successful in eliminating some of the more 
sinister uses of the tactic, such as racially motivated district-line drawing, 
gerrymandering inspired by partisan motives remains.  Continual 
improvements in technology coupled with an increasingly divided political 
culture mean that partisan gerrymandering is at risk of becoming more 
effective than ever.  As a result, the voices of individuals with political 
ideologies opposing those of the sitting state legislatures risk being quieted 
to barely audible whispers.  Until this year, however, the Supreme Court had 
contented itself to stand idly by, firmly refusing to wade into the legal and 
constitutional muck that is partisan gerrymandering. 
This Note explores the uses and effects of partisan gerrymandering by 
modern state legislatures.  It then delves into the contentious history of the 
partisan gerrymandering question at the Supreme Court level, with special 
focus on a concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy in which he proposed a 
solution for how to handle future partisan gerrymandering issues.  This Note 
analyzes the validity of Justice Kennedy’s solution and ultimately concludes 
that his proposal has sound legal and practical support and would allow 
courts to hold unconstitutional efforts to gerrymander along political lines. 
 
 
 
 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2018, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2012, Duke University.  I 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1812, then-Massachusetts Governor and future Vice President Elbridge 
Gerry reluctantly redrew the district lines of his home state in advance of 
forthcoming senatorial elections.1  Upon viewing Governor Gerry’s distorted 
districts, a cartoonist at the Boston Gazette coined the term “gerrymander” 
because he recognized a striking resemblance in the new pattern to the outline 
of a salamander.2  Although the cartoon arguably bears little resemblance to 
 
 1. See Jennifer Davis, Elbridge Gerry and the Monstrous Gerrymander, AM. TREASURES 
LIBR. CONGRESS (Feb. 10, 2017), https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2017/02/elbridge-gerry-and-the-
monstrous-gerrymander/ [https://perma.cc/RG5F-77E5]. 
 2. See id. 
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the amphibian, the term gerrymander was nevertheless born, and has survived 
for more than two centuries. 
Since the days of Elbridge Gerry, gerrymandering has become increasingly 
sophisticated, and two main strategies have emerged for drawing districts.  
The first is “packing.”  This method entails a state legislature redrawing 
district lines to fashion a single district with a disproportionate quantity of 
like-minded voters.3  This method effectively wastes votes; for example, 
instead of having three separate districts with 100 Democrats in each district, 
packing creates two districts with fifty Democrats in each, and one district 
with 200 Democrats.  Through packing, Republicans may, as in the above 
example, outnumber Democrats in two of the three altered districts, thus 
giving themselves an advantage in the contest to control the legislature.4 
The second method, called “cracking,” accomplishes the same goal as 
packing but in the opposite fashion.  When there is a naturally occurring high 
population of like-minded voters in a single district, the political party in 
power can draw new lines to split the like-minded voters into numerous 
different districts, creating a slight minority in each.5  For example, if there 
are 300 Democrats in a single district, and 101 Republicans in that same 
district as well as two other districts, the district lines could be redrawn to 
place 100 Democrats in each of three districts containing 101 Republicans, 
causing one fewer Democrat than Republican in each of the resulting 
districts. 
Whether by packing or cracking, the controlling political party in a state 
legislature can draw district lines to manipulate the proportion of opposing 
party constituents in any given district, thereby maximizing the chances its 
own party has to win the majority of districts in the state.6 
As gerrymandering methodology has become more refined, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has had occasion to hear a number of cases regarding the 
constitutionality of different redistricting plans.7  However, the Court has 
failed to establish a majority view of partisan gerrymandering in the past 
three decades.8  In recent years, the question of how to handle 
gerrymandering has become increasingly more pressing, particularly as 
district lines have been drawn with an amplified emphasis on political 
affiliation.9 
In 2004, the current trajectory of partisan gerrymandering was established 
in Vieth v. Jubelirer,10 in which the Court ruled that partisan gerrymandering 
 
 3. See Michael Weaver, Note, Uncertainty Maintained:  The Split Decision over Partisan 
Gerrymanders in Vieth v. Jubelirer, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1273, 1279 (2005). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id.  
 6. See id. at 1279–80 (“Regardless of the method employed, the outcome of 
gerrymandering is to draw boundaries in such a way that the groups opposing the new 
boundaries are concentrated so as to minimize their representation and influence.”). 
 7. See infra Part II.A. 
 8. See infra Part II.A. 
 9. See infra Part III.A. 
 10. 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
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is not justiciable.11  The decision was split, with Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia, Sandra Day O’Connor, and Clarence 
Thomas making up the plurality.12  Writing or joining dissenting opinions 
were Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, David Souter, and 
Stephen Breyer.13  Although some names have changed over the years, the 
same ideological divisions marked the Court’s most recent gerrymandering 
case, decided in 2015.14  One Justice, however, attempted to bridge the gap 
between the two distinct factions on the Court.  Justice Kennedy’s First 
Amendment solution,15 hiding in plain sight since 2004, could be the 
country’s path to settling the law on partisan gerrymandering. 
This Note explores the past, present, and future of partisan gerrymandering 
in the United States by analyzing the lengthy case history of the issue at the 
Supreme Court, an overlooked solution to the gerrymandering problem, and 
the newest challenge to the current partisan gerrymandering rule.  Part I 
examines the harsh reality that modern American voters face due to partisan 
gerrymandering and dedicates special attention to troubling electoral patterns 
in recent elections and the practical effects gerrymandering has had on 
citizens’ decisions to cast ballots.  Part II focuses on the long and contentious 
legal history surrounding partisan gerrymandering.  This Part examines the 
issue from congressional efforts in the nineteenth century, to the massive 
change in judicial responsibility in 2004, to the most recent potential shift in 
the Court’s governing principles in 2015.  Part II then examines Justice 
Kennedy’s proposed solution and assesses its viability.  Finally, Part III 
applies Justice Kennedy’s proposal to the gerrymandering problem and 
discusses the newest partisan gerrymandering case to be considered by the 
Court. 
I.  GERRYMANDERING IN MODERN AMERICA 
The foundation for legislative control over state redistricting is located in 
the U.S. Constitution, which states, “The Times, Places and Manner of 
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in 
each State by the Legislature thereof.”16  Although this Clause does allow for 
Congress to intercede and overrule the state legislature, such intervention has 
never occurred.17 
There are numerous lawful methods state legislatures may use to redraw 
district lines.  Traditionally, districts were required to be contiguous, 
compact, and, to the extent possible, contain an equal number of 
 
 11. Id. at 281 (plurality opinion). 
 12. See id. at 271. 
 13. See id. at 317 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 343 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 355 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 14. See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 
2659 (2015). 
 15. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 314–16 (Kennedy, J., concurring); infra Part II.C. 
 16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
 17. See Niel Franzese, Comment, The Open Our Democracy Act:  A Proposal for Effective 
Election Reform, 48 CONN. L. REV. 263, 285 (2015). 
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inhabitants.18  Those norms have since evolved, and today the only 
constitutional requirement for redistricting is the “one person, one vote” 
standard.19  While redistricting often includes geographic contiguity, 
geographic compactness, preserving communities of interest, and nesting,20 
over the years there have been two impermissible redistricting motivations 
that have invited judicial scrutiny.  The first, racially motivated 
gerrymandering, is generally the domain of the Supreme Court and is not the 
focus of this Note.21  The second, politically motivated (partisan) 
gerrymandering, by contrast, requires further analysis. 
A.  Why Should We Care About Gerrymandering? 
To explain the severity of partisan gerrymandering, NBC News 
correspondent Tom Brokaw once said: 
The fact is the system is rigged. . . .  Seventy-five percent of the 
congressmen come from gerrymandered districts in which they’re 
bulletproof.  They only play to one constituency.  There are no swing states.  
They don’t go home and have to prove their case, because they’ve got a 
choir back home.  And that’s a huge part of the problem here.22 
While lack of responsibility is a part of the problem, the rigged system itself 
is also a significant public policy issue:  an elected official shielded from 
dissenting opinions by the manipulation of electoral districts has little 
incentive to represent the whole of his or her electorate. 
Due to inaction, the judicial system has arguably become part of the 
problem as well.  By maintaining relative silence on the issue of 
gerrymandering, the Court has effectively washed its hands of the problem.23  
Some legislatures have proved capable of drawing equitable district lines.24  
But others have not demonstrated a balanced response to the pressures of 
gerrymandering, and the Court has appeared content to sit idly by instead of 
holding legislatures accountable.25  The Court’s silence may lead one to 
believe gerrymandering is not as severe as portrayed by Mr. Brokaw, but 
facts and figures from recent elections substantiate his concern. 
 
 18. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 276 (plurality opinion). 
 19. See Ethan Weiss, Comment, Partisan Gerrymandering and the Elusive Standard, 53 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 693, 697 (2013). 
 20. See id. 
 21. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 22. Donovan Slack, Brokaw:  ‘The System Is Rigged,’ POLITICO (Dec. 30, 2012, 11:34 
AM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/politico-now/2012/12/brokaw-the-system-is-rigged-
152993 [https://perma.cc/5SRR-CVFE] (offering Brokaw’s analysis as to what is wrong with 
Washington on Meet the Press). 
 23. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281 (concluding that partisan gerrymandering ought to be 
nonjusticiable). 
 24. See infra notes 129–32 and accompanying text. 
 25. See infra Part II.B. 
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1.  Hard Numbers from Recent Elections 
One way to identify political gerrymandering is to examine the popular 
vote and the number of seats achieved in the U.S. House of Representatives.  
A disparity between the overall vote for a given party in a particular state and 
the proportion of seats that party obtains in the House is not in and of itself 
cause for alarm; it is likely that no one district is a perfect representation of 
the state as a whole.26  One would expect these disparities to be minor, yet 
that is often not the case in the United States, which has a history rife with 
patterns of political disparity—an indication that gerrymandering has been at 
play.27 
From the end of World War II through 1994, the Democrats enjoyed a 
disproportionate number of seats in the House of Representatives compared 
to their popular support.28  The pendulum began to swing, however, with the 
Republican Revolution of 1994.29  In every election since, the Republican 
Party has earned more seats in the House of Representatives than their 
popular vote tally would predict.30  This trend has increased in recent years, 
with the 6 percent gap achieved by Republicans in 2012 representing the 
largest disparity between the popular vote and House seats won since the 
Democrats’ win in the 1992 election.31  In fact, the 2012 election saw nearly 
1.6 million more votes cast for Democratic candidates than were cast for 
Republican candidates in races for House seats.32  However, when the dust 
settled, Republicans maintained a thirty-four-seat advantage in the House.33 
This imbalance was no accident.  The Republican State Leadership 
Committee proudly broadcast its winning strategy in an article headlined 
“How a Strategy of Targeting State Legislative Races in 2010 Led to a 
Republican U.S. House Majority in 2013.”34 
Both Democrats and Republicans have successfully used redistricting to 
achieve electoral victories disproportionate to the popular vote.35  In 2002, 
356 of the 435 total seats in the House were decided by margins greater than 
20 percent, which highlights how noncompetitive a redistricting plan can 
 
 26. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 289 (“In any winner-take-all district system, there can be no 
guarantee, no matter how the district lines are drawn, that a majority of party votes statewide 
will produce a majority of seats for that party.”). 
 27. See Nathan S. Catanese, Note, Gerrymandered Gridlock:  Addressing the Hazardous 
Impact of Partisan Redistricting, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 323, 331 (2014). 
 28. See id. 
 29. See id. 
 30. See id. 
 31. See id. 
 32. See OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, STATISTICS OF THE 
PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 6, 2012, at 73 (2013) (showing 
the total number of votes cast for each political party). 
 33. See id. at 74. 
 34. Admin, 2012 REDMAP Summary Report, REDISTRICTING MAJORITY PROJECT (Jan. 4, 
2013, 9:23 AM), http://www.redistrictingmajorityproject.com/ [https://perma.cc/W4C9-
567D]. 
 35. See Franzese, supra note 17, at 286.  Wide margins of victory and strong incumbent 
success rates in particular demonstrate the power of redistricting. 
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make an election.36  In all House races, only four incumbents who were pitted 
against nonincumbents suffered defeat in 2002.37  Two years later, in 2004, 
incumbent success rates exceeded 98 percent for the fourth consecutive 
election.38 
On a micro level, six states stand out for their gerrymandering-induced 
electoral anomalies.  In Florida, 40 percent of voters are registered Democrats 
and 36 percent are registered Republicans.39  Yet in 2014, of the 160 total 
seats in the state legislature, Republicans occupied 108.40  This discrepancy 
between registered Democrats and seats occupied by Democrats has a long 
history in Florida.  Before 2016, the state voted Democrat in four of the six 
previous presidential elections.41  But in 2012, Democrats won only twenty-
three of the forty-seven available seats, even though they tallied better than 
120,000 more votes than Republican candidates in contested races and 52 
percent of the overall popular vote.42 
Pennsylvania also demonstrates the effects of gerrymandering.  In 2012, 
voters cast 2,701,820 votes for Democrats and 2,626,995 votes for 
Republicans.43  Nevertheless, only five Democratic candidates were elected 
to Congress compared to thirteen Republicans.44  The 2014 election was 
similarly affected by gerrymandering.  Fifty percent of the electorate were 
registered Democrats compared to just 37 percent Republicans, but the state 
legislature was nevertheless composed of 149 Republicans and only 104 
Democrats.45  The 2014 election showed similar results in Kentucky, 
Louisiana, North Carolina, and West Virginia.46 
 
 36. See id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Mark Blumenthal & Ariel Edwards-Levy, HUFFPOLLSTER:  A State-By-State Guide 
to Party Registration, HUFFINGTON POST (May 27, 2014, 5:37 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/27/state-party-registration_n_5399977.html 
[https://perma.cc/SFK8-F7Y6]. 
 40. See 2014 State & Legislative Partisan Composition, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES 
(Nov. 19, 2014, 10:00 AM) http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/Elections/ 
Legis_Control_2014_Nov19_10am.pdf [https://perma.cc/T73A-ZD7B]. 
 41. See Devon Ombres, The Recent History of Gerrymandering in Florida:  Revitalizing 
Davis v. Bandemer and Florida’s Constitutional Requirements on Redistricting, 20 WASH. & 
LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 297, 300–01 (2014). 
 42. See id. at 323. 
 43. Catanese, supra note 27, at 329. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See 2014 State & Legislative Partisan Composition, supra note 40; Blumenthal & 
Edwards-Levy, supra note 39. 
 46. Blumenthal & Edwards-Levy, supra note 39.  In Kentucky, 54 percent of the 
population registered as Democrats and 39 percent as Republicans, yet 52 percent of the state 
legislature is Republican. Id.  In Louisiana, 59 percent of the Louisiana state legislature is 
Republican, despite 19 percent more voters registering as Democrats than as Republicans. Id.  
North Carolina features a state legislature that is 63.5 percent Republican even though 43 
percent of its population is Democratic, with 31 percent Republican. Id.  Finally, 61 percent 
of the state legislature of West Virginia is Republican despite a full 50 percent of its electorate 
being registered as Democrats and only 29 percent as Republicans. Id. 
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2.  Practical Effects on Voting 
Resulting from Gerrymandering 
Numbers aside, gerrymandering has real, practical effects.  In a 
competitive race, people are more likely to vote.47  Gerrymandering, 
however, renders races less competitive, making a person’s vote essentially 
moot even years before Election Day.48  A would-be voter who suspects 
years in advance that casting a vote for a particular political party will be for 
naught is likely to experience a decreased incentive to express a political 
choice.49  The perceived futility of voting in gerrymandered districts has 
inspired voters to bring petitions against gerrymandering.50 
Given that the general election is often a foregone conclusion, the only 
meaningful choice many voters have is in primary elections.51  However, in 
some states, primary elections are only open to registered members of a 
party.52  As such, would-be independent voters must register with one of the 
dominant political parties in order to have any say in who may eventually 
hold the public office.53  With the primary election often the only contest that 
matters, more partisan candidates, who often fare better in primaries where 
they do not have to appeal to the median voter, are never forced to engage 
seriously with the opposing party.54 
These effects of partisan gerrymandering could well be heightened in 
future elections.  Unlike the state legislatures in Elbridge Gerry’s day, today’s 
state legislatures have the benefit of sophisticated computer programs to 
create precise lines to maximize packing and cracking techniques.55  This 
new gerrymandering technology allows mapmakers to learn an area’s 
political leanings and adapt that information to create district lines in 
whatever manner they see fit.56  The programs not only allow mapmakers to 
increase the speed with which they can draw new district lines by creating 
 
 47. See Catanese, supra note 27, at 340. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See id. (“[Gerrymandering] can have the practical consequence of rendering a person’s 
vote pointless. . . .  For instance, if someone lives in a congressional district in which the results 
of an election, based on the partisan make-up of the district, are easily predictable, a voter may 
not have an incentive to vote.”). 
 50. See Samuel S.-H. Wang, Three Tests for Practical Evaluation of Partisan 
Gerrymandering, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1263, 1271 (2016) (explaining that litigants bring cases 
because gerrymandering results in candidates who are not representative of the population’s 
views). 
 51. See id. at 1272 (“[T]he noncompetitive nature of the general election leaves the 
primary election as the only avenue for voters to affect their representation.”). 
 52. Primaries, FAIRVOTE, http://www.fairvote.org/primaries#open_and_closed_ 
primaries/ [https://perma.cc/LK26-E4BE] (last visited Nov. 19, 2017) (“In a closed primary, 
only voters registered with a given party can vote in that party’s primary.”). 
 53. See Wang, supra note 50, at 1272. 
 54. See Primaries, supra note 52 (“[C]ritics claim that closed primaries can exacerbate 
the radicalization that often occurs at the primary stage, when candidates must cater to their 
party’s ‘base’ rather than the political center.”). 
 55. See Richard E. Levy, The Nonpartisanship Principle, 25 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 377, 
388–89 (2016); Wang, supra note 50, at 1267. 
 56. See Catanese, supra note 27, at 333. 
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massive databases with detailed voter-registration information, but they also 
allow their calculations to be sensitive to recent voting trends.57 
Gerrymandered districts often result in representatives who are responsive 
neither to their constituents nor to shifts in public opinion.58  This led Justice 
Stevens to write that “ample evidence demonstrates that many of today’s 
congressional representatives owe their election not to ‘the People of the 
several states’ but to the mercy of state legislatures.”59 
B.  The Glimmer of Hope for a Partisan Gerrymandering Resolution 
While the Supreme Court has largely resisted addressing partisan 
gerrymandering, Justice Kennedy has attempted to find a middle ground 
between the ideological factions of the Court.  In his concurring opinion in 
Vieth,60 Justice Kennedy argued that “in another case a standard might 
emerge that suitably demonstrates how an apportionment’s de facto 
incorporation of partisan classifications burdens rights of fair and effective 
representation.”61 
In Justice Kennedy’s view, the path to such a suitable standard is through 
the First Amendment: 
First Amendment concerns arise where a State enacts a law that has the 
purpose and effect of subjecting a group of voters or their party to 
disfavored treatment by reason of their views.  In the context of partisan 
gerrymandering, that means that First Amendment concerns arise where an 
apportionment has the purpose and effect of burdening a group of voters’ 
representational rights.62 
The “First Amendment interest” identified by Justice Kennedy is directly 
involved in partisan gerrymandering because the interest includes “not 
burdening or penalizing citizens because of their participation in the electoral 
process, their voting history, their association with a political party, or their 
expression of political views.”63  Justice Kennedy, however, did not convince 
his fellow Justices of his First Amendment solution and none joined his 
concurring opinion.64  Now, more than a decade after Justice Kennedy 
identified the First Amendment interest, a recent decision may provide the 
opportunity to revisit his proposed solution.65 
 
 57. See id. 
 58. See Wang, supra note 50, at 1320–21. 
 59. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 331 n.24 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Note, A New Map:  Partisan Gerrymandering as a Federalism Injury, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
1196, 1202 (2004)). 
 60. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 61. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 312 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 62. Id. at 314. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 306. 
 65. See infra Part II.A.3. 
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II.  THE CONTENTIOUS REALITY OF 
PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING 
AT THE SUPREME COURT 
Turning to how the Supreme Court has handled cases of partisan 
gerrymandering and how partisan gerrymandering (which is not per se 
unconstitutional) differs from racial gerrymandering (which is 
unconstitutional), Part II refines our understanding of the terms and 
consequences of the gerrymandering debate. 
A.  Setting the Stage:  
A Brief Judicial History of Gerrymandering 
Before turning to how and why the Supreme Court has characterized 
partisan gerrymandering as nonjusticiable, even though the Court has held 
racial gerrymandering is justiciable, it is instructive to first examine how the 
Court has generally handled issues concerning gerrymandering. 
1.  The Early History of Gerrymandering 
Before the Supreme Court dealt with gerrymandering, Congress took 
incremental steps toward mitigating the problem.  Beginning in 1842, 
Congress mandated that districts have a single representative and be 
contiguous.66  In 1872, Congress passed a statute that required districts, to 
the extent possible, to have an equal number of constituents.67 
The Supreme Court first considered gerrymandering in 1962 in Baker v. 
Carr.68  The Court split six to two, ruled that redistricting was a justiciable 
issue, and outlined a six-factor test that included the “one person, one vote” 
standard as well as the requirement that each district have an equal 
population.69  In 1973, the Court again addressed partisan gerrymandering in 
Gaffney v. Cummings.70  In Gaffney, the Court upheld a Connecticut 
redistricting plan, but the Justices left open the possibility that certain plans 
 
 66. See 1842 Apportionment Act, ch. XLVII, § 2, 5 Stat. 491, 491 (1842) 
(“[A]pportionment shall be elected by districts composed of contiguous territory equal in 
number to the number of Representatives to which said State may be entitled, no one district 
electing more than one Representative.”); Catanese, supra note 27, at 326; Justin Levitt, Where 
Are the Lines Drawn?, ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING, http://redistricting.lls.edu/where-state.php 
[https://perma.cc/3HUW-TRS9] (last visited Nov. 17, 2017) (“A district is contiguous if you 
can travel from any point in the district to any other point in the district without crossing the 
district’s boundary.  Put differently, all portions of the district are physically adjacent.”). 
 67. See Catanese, supra note 27, at 326. 
 68. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 69. Id. at 208 (explaining that a “citizen’s right to a vote free of arbitrary impairment by 
state action has been judicially recognized as a right secured by the Constitution” with regard 
to dilution by a false vote tally, a refusal to count votes from select precincts, or by stuffing 
the ballot box); Franzese, supra note 17, at 287. 
 70. 412 U.S. 735 (1973). 
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may be unconstitutional if the motivation for redistricting was a desire for 
political advancement.71 
A more concrete rule concerning partisan gerrymandering was established 
in 1986 in Davis v. Bandemer.72  Although the redistricting plan in question 
was not declared unconstitutional, the Court ruled, for the first time, that 
partisan gerrymandering was justiciable.73  The Court explained that a 
challenge to partisan gerrymandering could be successful if a plaintiff was 
able to show that the state legislature (1) intentionally discriminated against 
a certain group and (2) utilized gerrymandering in such a way as to cause a 
discriminatory effect.74  Although the Court’s majority agreed that partisan 
gerrymandering was justiciable, Bandemer was nevertheless a fractured 
decision.  While a plurality of Justices favored expanding the intent-effect 
standard, all disagreed over the standard the Court should adopt.75  Justice 
O’Connor wrote a concurring opinion questioning the justiciability of 
partisan gerrymandering altogether.76  While appearing to settle the 
justiciability of partisan gerrymandering, Bandemer ultimately left lower 
courts with more questions than answers.77 
2.  The Controlling Law:  Vieth v. Jubelirer 
In 2004, Vieth marked the end of the Bandemer standard.78  In Vieth, 
Justice Scalia, writing for a plurality of the Court, overruled Bandemer and 
framed the issue of partisan gerrymandering in the manner we think of it 
today.79  However, the end of the Bandemer standard did not mark the 
beginning of a clear standard on the issue of partisan gerrymandering.  In a 
fractured opinion that did not muster support from a majority of the Justices 
and spawned a number of separate concurring and dissenting opinions, the 
only point on which the Justices did agree was that the Bandemer standard 
needed serious change.80 
 
 71. See id. at 754 (“What is done in so arranging for elections, or to achieve political ends 
or allocate political power, is not wholly exempt from judicial scrutiny under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”). 
 72. 478 U.S. 109 (1986). 
 73. Id. at 125 (“As Gaffney demonstrates, that the claim is submitted by a political group, 
rather than a racial group, does not distinguish it in terms of justiciability.”). 
 74. Id. at 127. 
 75. See Weiss, supra note 19, at 699. 
 76. See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 144 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“I would hold that the 
partisan gerrymandering claims of major political parties raise a nonjusticiable political 
question.”). 
 77. See Weiss, supra note 19, at 699–700 (“[T]here was only one instance where a court 
actually found a cognizable unlawful partisan gerrymander under Bandemer.  Other than this 
one anomaly, Bandemer proved an inapplicable standard.”). 
 78. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“Eighteen years 
of essentially pointless litigation have persuaded us that Bandemer is incapable of principled 
application.”). 
 79. See id.  
 80. See generally id.  Each of the opinions authored in Vieth offered different solutions on 
how to either change or improve Bandemer. 
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Suppose you learn that New York draws its district lines for the express 
purpose of diminishing the strength of the votes of African American voters.  
Odds are that you would get that heavy feeling in your stomach, you would 
shake your head in some combination of surprise and disgust, and you may 
even take to Twitter to express your indignation. 
Now imagine that New York draws its district lines not to diminish the 
strength of African American votes but rather to diminish the strength of 
Republican votes.  This iteration may not gnaw at your insides in the same 
way.  Why, though, should it matter which class of citizen is being targeted? 
Vieth implicitly raised this very issue and the plurality, comprised of Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Associate Justices Scalia, O’Connor, and Thomas, 
maintained that there is an inherent difference between partisan 
gerrymandering and racial gerrymandering.81  Although the Court had 
previously found a workable standard for racial gerrymandering, the plurality 
believed that the same standard could not be used for partisan 
gerrymandering.82  As such, the plurality held that “no judicially discernible 
and manageable standards for adjudicating political gerrymandering claims 
have emerged [since Bandemer].  Lacking them, we must conclude that 
political gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable and that Bandemer was 
wrongly decided.”83 
For the plurality, neither the plaintiff’s predominant-effect test nor the 
litigant’s intent test was sufficient to make the issue justiciable.84  According 
to Justice Scalia, although a predominant intent may be feasible with regard 
to racial gerrymandering,85 it is not feasible with regard to partisan 
gerrymandering because “[p]olitical affiliation is not an immutable 
characteristic, but may shift from one election to the next; and even within a 
given election, not all voters follow the party line.”86  The plurality further 
noted that “[t]hese facts make it impossible to assess the effects of partisan 
gerrymandering, to fashion a standard for evaluating a violation, and finally 
to craft a remedy.”87 
Indeed, there is a statutory basis for the Court’s hard stance on racial 
gerrymandering that is not present in partisan gerrymandering.88  The Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 explicitly states that no voting procedure should be 
applied that denies or abridges the right of an American citizen to vote on the 
basis of race or color.89  The Court has invoked this statute in part when 
explaining why there is a difference between drawing lines to disenfranchise 
 
 81. See id. at 287 (“[A] person’s politics is rarely as readily discernible—and never as 
permanently discernible—as a person’s race.”). 
 82. See id. at 287–90. 
 83. Id. at 281. 
 84. See id. at 284–85; see also Weiss, supra note 19, at 701. 
 85. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 285 (“[A]pplying a ‘predominant intent’ test to racial 
gerrymandering is easier and less disruptive.”). 
 86. Id. at 287. 
 87. Id. (citing Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 156 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
 88. See 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2012). 
 89. Id. 
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racial or ethnic minority groups versus doing so to disenfranchise on the basis 
of political affiliation.90 
The Court has consistently held that districting based on race is 
unconstitutional,91 rejecting any attempt to draw lines where the only 
conceivable purpose is to segregate voters by race.92  Similarly, it has been 
established that gerrymandering is unconstitutional where race—and not 
other principles—is the dominant rationale for drawing district lines.93  Yet 
the plurality declined to apply the judicial history surrounding racial 
gerrymandering to partisan gerrymandering.94 
Justice Kennedy concurred with the plurality, agreeing that the plaintiffs 
had failed to establish a claim, and thus giving the Court the five votes needed 
to overrule Bandemer.95  He did not, however, share the plurality’s analysis 
of the distinction between racial and partisan gerrymandering, nor did he 
agree with the plurality that there could never be a workable standard to make 
partisan gerrymandering justiciable.96 
Justice Stevens was the first of the dissenting opinions in Vieth.97  In this 
dissent, which no other Justice joined, he stated that there should not be a 
distinction drawn between racial gerrymandering and partisan 
gerrymandering: 
Gerrymandering always involves the drawing of district boundaries to 
maximize the voting strength of the dominant political faction and to 
minimize the strength of one or more groups of opponents. . . .  It follows 
that the standards that enable courts to identify and redress a racial 
gerrymander could also perform the same function for other species of 
gerrymanders.98 
According to Justice Stevens, race can be a factor in assessing the district 
lines but cannot solely dictate the outcome of the districting process.99  He is 
of the belief that partisanship should also be treated in a similar fashion.100  
Much like Justice Kennedy’s opinion, no other Justice joined in Justice 
Stevens’s opinion. 
Justice Souter, in a dissent joined by Justice Ginsburg, wrote that a new 
rule should replace the ineffective Bandemer standard.101  Justice Souter’s 
new standard required (1) intent, (2) proof that the plaintiff was in a cohesive 
political group, (3) proof that the district was drawn against traditional 
 
 90. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 286–87. 
 91. See id. at 286 (“[T]he purpose of segregating voters on the basis of race is not a lawful 
one . . . .”). 
 92. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646–47 (1993). 
 93. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 913 (1995). 
 94. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 287. 
 95. See id. at 315–17 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 96. See id. at 306; supra Part I.B. 
 97. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 317 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 98. Id.at 335–36. 
 99. Id. at 336. 
 100. Id. (“[P]artisanship [can] be a permissible consideration in drawing district lines, so 
long as it does not predominate.”). 
 101. Id. at 345–50 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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criteria, (4) a correlation between drawing and political group, and (5) a 
proposal for a better district line.102  This standard was not, however, 
accepted by the other seven Justices. 
Finally, Justice Breyer argued that, though partisan gerrymandering 
sometimes serves no plausible purpose, it could nevertheless be acceptable 
in some cases and thus cannot be summarily dismissed.103 
3.  Threats to Vieth 
The 2006 case League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry 
(LULAC)104 again dealt with the gerrymandering question.  In LULAC, the 
Court, though once again thoroughly divided, upheld Vieth.105  Justice 
Kennedy, writing for the majority of the Court with respect to just two parts 
of his opinion, declined to address the broader justiciability question and 
instead focused on whether the standard proposed by the League of United 
Latin American Citizens (LULAC) was workable.106  He rejected the 
plaintiff’s standard and wrote that the “sole-intent” standard lacked a 
showing that there was an actual burden to LULAC and that the proposed 
symmetry standard—which compared results of an election to the 
hypothetical scenario where the parties’ vote shares were reversed—failed to 
show “how much partisan dominance is too much.”107 
Justice Kennedy did, however, explicitly outline the standard necessary for 
partisan gerrymandering to be ruled unconstitutional.  He wrote that “a 
successful claim attempting to identify unconstitutional acts of partisan 
gerrymandering must do what appellants’ sole-motivation theory explicitly 
disavows:  show a burden, as measured by a reliable standard, on the 
complainants’ representational rights.”108 
In multiple dissents, Justices Stevens, Breyer, and Souter once again 
argued for the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering.109  And, yet again, 
they could not agree with each other on a governing standard:  Justice Breyer 
joined Justice Stevens only in part, and Justice Souter was once again only 
supported by Justice Ginsburg.110 
In 2015, Justice Ginsburg reignited conversation on partisan 
gerrymandering in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent 
Redistricting Commission.111  This case, unlike Vieth and LULAC, concerned 
 
 102. See id.; see also Weiss, supra note 19, at 702 (outlining the aspects of Justices Souter 
and Ginsburg’s plan, which they believed should replace Bandemer). 
 103. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 355 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[P]ure politics often helps to 
secure constitutionally important democratic objectives.  But sometimes it does not.  
Sometimes purely political ‘gerrymandering’ will fail to advance any plausible democratic 
objective while simultaneously threatening serious democratic harm.”). 
 104. 548 U.S. 399 (2006). 
 105. Id. at 410. 
 106. See id. at 414. 
 107. Id. at 418–20; see also Weiss, supra note 19, at 704–05. 
 108. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 418. 
 109. See id. at 447, 483; see also Weiss, supra note 19, at 705. 
 110. See LULAC, 548 U.S. at 447, 483. 
 111. 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015). 
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the ability of an independent commission to take over the redistricting 
process, thus seemingly obviating partisan gerrymandering concerns.112  
Justice Ginsburg, adopting language from Kennedy’s Vieth concurrence, 
stated, “‘[P]artisan gerrymanders,’ this Court has recognized, ‘[are 
incompatible] with democratic principles.’”113 
Although the question of justiciability was not central to the decision, 
Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission was a significant setback for 
supporters of partisan gerrymandering.  Finding that independent 
commissions were constitutional, the Court effectively took district-drawing 
power away from the Arizona state legislature.114  That Justice Kennedy 
joined the four liberal justices in the majority opinion on a partisan 
gerrymandering issue may foreshadow a majority decision on the 
justiciability of partisan gerrymandering this term.115 
B.  Weighing the Court’s Views 
on Gerrymandering Justiciability  
Having described the divide along ideological lines at the Supreme Court 
with regard to partisan gerrymandering, the question remains:  Why, exactly, 
does an ideological split exist? 
1.  The Argument That Partisan Gerrymandering 
Is Nonjusticiable 
In addition to the racial gerrymandering argument,116 Justice Scalia argued 
that a ban on partisan gerrymandering would be akin to a standard that says 
groups have a right to proportional representation.117  “[T]he Constitution 
contains no such principle.  It guarantees equal protection of the law to 
persons, not equal representation in government to equivalently sized groups.  
It nowhere says that . . . Republicans or Democrats . . . must be accorded 
political strength proportionate to their numbers.”118 
Justice Scalia points to Article 1, Section 4 of the Constitution, the so-
called Time, Place and Manner Clause, to justify his argument that the Court 
should stay out of partisan gerrymandering matters.119  Section 4, however, 
also states that “Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such 
Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.”120  Therefore, 
absent a Fourteenth Amendment discrimination issue, it is arguable that 
Congress has a responsibility to stem the tide of partisan gerrymanders, even 
 
 112. See id. at 2658. 
 113. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 292 (2004) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 114. Id. at 2659 (affirming the district court’s dismissal of the Arizona State Legislature’s 
complaint). 
 115. See infra Part III.E. 
 116. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 117. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 288 (plurality opinion). 
 118. Id. 
 119. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
 120. Id. 
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though such power has never been used before.121  Support for that notion 
can be found in Wesberry v. Sanders,122 which established that judicial 
intervention is appropriate if a state legislature redistricts to debase voting 
power,123 thus empowering the judiciary to be an active participant in the 
outcome of partisan gerrymandering. 
Article 1, Section 5 further militates against judicial involvement, as it 
gives each house of Congress the power to judge its own elections.124  In the 
past, however, this level of autonomy has not been afforded to Congress.  In 
Powell v. McCormack,125 the Court established boundaries within which 
Congress must operate when judging its elections.126  This ruling could 
function as the opportunity needed for the Court to overcome a Section 5 
challenge by allowing intervention when a legislature redistricts to 
disadvantage a political party.127 
2.  The Court in a Passive Role 
Having discussed Justice Scalia’s stance on the Court’s relationship with 
partisan gerrymandering, the pertinent question shifts to the effects of this 
stance, including how states have responded to gerrymandering in the Court’s 
absence and to what extent gerrymandering actually causes a problem.  While 
the Supreme Court has remained deadlocked in deciding how to handle 
partisan gerrymandering, some states have taken it upon themselves to tackle 
the issue head-on in the absence of judicial intervention.128 
California, for instance, has approved an independent commission to draw 
district lines.129  The commission comprises three registered Democrats, 
three registered Republicans, and two members who are either unregistered 
or affiliated with a minor party.130  The early returns on the commission are 
good for California, as four seats changed parties in the 2012 election—the 
first with the new commission—as compared to the one seat that had changed 
over the previous ten years.131  Like California, Washington, Idaho, and 
 
 121. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 122. 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
 123. See id. at 7–8 (arguing that the framers of the Constitution could not have meant for 
the strength of voters’ ballots to be dependent on what district the voters belonged to, and to 
say otherwise “would not only run counter to our fundamental ideas of democratic 
government, it would cast aside the principle of a House of Representatives elected ‘by the 
People,’ a principle tenaciously fought for and established at the Constitutional Convention”). 
 124. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5. 
 125. 395 U.S. 486 (1969). 
 126. Id. at 548 (“[W]e have concluded that Art. I, § 5, is at most a ‘textually demonstrable 
commitment’ to Congress to judge only the qualifications expressly set forth in the 
Constitution.  Therefore, the ‘textual commitment’ formulation of the political question 
doctrine does not bar federal courts from adjudicating petitioners’ claims.”). 
 127. See Weiss, supra note 19, at 710–11. 
 128. See Catanese, supra note 27, at 326–27. 
 129. See id. at 326. 
 130. Id. at 343. 
 131. Id. at 344. 
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Arizona have all instituted independent commissions to advance similar 
plans.132 
Iowa has similarly made strides in curbing partisan gerrymandering.  
There, a nonpartisan legislative services agency draws the district lines and 
presents the map to the state legislature for approval.133  Iowa also has 
specific laws for how lines must be drawn.  For example, counties cannot be 
divided, districts should be compact, and population size must be within 
1 percent of the ideal population size as determined by the state.134 
Although there is some evidence that gerrymandering is to blame for 
lopsided election results, there is also evidence that it is not the only culprit.  
Voters have a tendency to live in politically segregated neighborhoods.135  
Democratic voters, for example, are more likely to settle in densely populated 
urban areas,136  while Republican voters are likely to settle in more rural areas 
with low population density.137  There is also some evidence that 
gerrymandering-related problems wane after the first election in the cycle 
and continue to lessen as time extends further from the date of the last 
redrawing.138 
Recent studies have demonstrated that gerrymandering is not to blame for 
the current polarization in politics.139  Indeed, some studies show that the 
Senate has become equally as polarized as the House of Representatives.140  
The implication here is that the polarization in the House cannot be to the 
result of gerrymandered district lines because Senators are elected by the 
state as a whole and not by allegedly unfair districts.  Studies also show that 
polarization in the House is not believed to be the cause of the polarization 
in the Senate, further distancing the connection between polarization and 
gerrymandering.141 
C.  Hedging Against the Nonjusticiable Ruling:  
Justice Kennedy’s First Amendment Solution 
The counterpoint to Justice Scalia’s hard line on the justiciability of 
partisan gerrymandering is Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Vieth.142  The 
Supreme Court has consistently left the door ajar on determining whether 
partisan gerrymandering is justiciable.  Justice Kennedy, the swing vote in 
Vieth and the author of the majority opinion in LULAC, was not persuaded 
by the standards proposed in those cases, yet he has consistently written that 
 
 132. See id. 
 133. See id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See Wang, supra note 50, at 1267–68. 
 136. See id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See id. at 1268. 
 139. See Franzese, supra note 17, at 291 (“Current studies suggest that gerrymandering is 
not an important cause of polarization . . . .”). 
 140. See id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See supra Part I.B. 
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he believed a standard could exist.143  Given Kennedy’s status as the swing 
vote, the viability of his First Amendment suggestion—specifically the 
freedoms of association and speech—should be considered by future 
plaintiffs. 
Justice Kennedy’s solution has pros and cons.  That political affiliation, 
unlike ethnicity or gender, is easily changeable supports the contention that 
political affiliation falls under the umbrella of association or speech.144  The 
Court has previously utilized the First Amendment to prevent discrimination 
against political parties.145  It has leaned on the First Amendment to ensure 
that parties announce their candidates at the same time as one another to 
alleviate the burden on the freedom of association.146  Similarly, the First 
Amendment is invoked when making employment decisions based on 
political affiliation.147 
Even so, Justice Scalia opposed the idea of depending upon the First 
Amendment in Vieth.148  According to Scalia, if a First Amendment claim 
were to be sustained, it “would render unlawful all consideration of political 
affiliation in districting, just as it renders unlawful all consideration of 
political affiliation in hiring for non-policy-level government jobs.”149  For 
Scalia, the First Amendment requires not the equal treatment of political 
parties but rather that party affiliation be disregarded altogether.150 
Political parties are the “most important mechanism for incorporating [a] 
citizen’s preferences,” and it is the right of association that recognizes 
parties’ vital role.151  The Supreme Court has previously found an acceptable 
standard that balances the right of association with state interest by striking 
down instances where associational rights were severely burdened.152  A First 
Amendment standard focused on association would not require political 
parties to be viewed as suspect classes to apply strict scrutiny.153  The focus 
would be on the goal of government classification, as freedom of association 
 
 143. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399, 418 (2006) 
(discussing what a successful claim identifying unconstitutional acts would require). 
 144. See Wang, supra note 50, at 1273–74. 
 145. See Weiss, supra note 19, at 713. 
 146. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 786 (1983) (reversing the appellate court’s 
holding that Ohio may force third-party candidates to announce their candidacy earlier than 
candidates of the major parties in order to appear on the ballot). 
 147. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 363 (1976) (stating that if public employment is to be 
conditioned on the employee’s political support of a party, it must “further some vital 
government end by a means that is least restrictive of freedom of belief and association in 
achieving that end, and the benefit gained must outweigh the loss of constitutionally protected 
rights”). 
 148. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 294 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. JoAnn D. Kamuf, Note, “Should I Stay or Should I Go?”:  The Current State of 
Partisan Gerrymandering Adjudication and a Proposal for the Future, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 
163, 210 (2005) (quoting Bernard Grofman, Criteria for Districting:  A Social Science 
Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REV. 77, 112 (1985)). 
 152. See id. at 209–10. 
 153. See id. at 210. 
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recognizes First Amendment protections for particular viewpoints, including 
those of democratic structures.154 
The Supreme Court has stated that the import of the First Amendment is 
greatest when considering speech taking place during a campaign for political 
office. 
Speech is an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold 
officials accountable to the people. . . .  The right of citizens to inquire, to 
hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consensus is a precondition 
to enlightened self-government and a necessary means to protect it.155 
Although the Court has accepted nonverbal forms of speech in certain 
situations (such as campaign finance), it has not explicitly decided whether 
the act of voting qualifies as speech.156  Lower courts, however, have on 
occasion implicitly supported the interpretation of voting as speech.157 
Although the Court has never expressly regarded voting as speech, it has 
equated casting a ballot to speech with regard to political expression.  In 
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,158 the Court explicitly refused to “stop 
to canvass the relation between voting and political expression.”159  But Doe 
v. Reed,160 decided in 2010, offers the most compelling evidence yet that 
voting itself is an expression of political speech.  At issue in Doe was the 
disclosure of information on a referendum petition in Washington.161  
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts stated that an individual 
expresses a political viewpoint when signing a referendum petition.162  
Furthermore, Roberts stated that expression of a political view falls under the 
umbrella of the First Amendment.163 
Roberts, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Alito all believed that the 
signing of a referendum petition qualified as an expression of political 
belief—even when the result of the petition is simply to place the issue on 
the ballot in the next election.164  Although not stated explicitly, it would 
follow that those Justices also believe physically casting a vote on the 
referendum after the successful petition is also a political expression.165  
 
 154. See id. 
 155. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010); see also id. (“The First Amendment 
‘has its fullest and most urgent application to speech uttered during a campaign for political 
office.’” (quoting Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989))). 
 156. Armand Derfner & J. Gerald Hebert, Voting Is Speech, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 471, 
485 (2016) (arguing that the Court has never rejected the argument that voting is under the 
purview of the First Amendment). 
 157. See, e.g., Turner v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 77 F. Supp. 2d 25, 31 (D.D.C. 
1999) (“When a citizen steps into the voting booth to cast a vote on a matter properly on the 
ballot, he or she intends to send a message in support of or in opposition to the candidate or 
ballot measure at issue.”). 
 158. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
 159. Id. at 665. 
 160. 561 U.S. 186 (2010). 
 161. See id. at 194. 
 162. Id. 
 163. See id. at 195. 
 164. See id. 
 165. See Derfner & Hebert, supra note 156, at 487 (“Voting and petition-signing plainly 
express a point of view and represent a decision to sign on to a particular idea in the 
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Thus, if voting on a referendum were an expression of a political viewpoint, 
so too is voting for a candidate on Election Day.  As such, this vote, like the 
petition, would be entitled to protection under the First Amendment. 
III.  PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING JUSTICIABILITY 
THROUGH THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
In light of the Supreme Court’s past stance on gerrymandering, as well as 
its First Amendment jurisprudence, partisan gerrymandering cases should be 
deemed justiciable by way of First Amendment freedoms.  This Note thus 
argues against the Court’s hands-off stance on partisan gerrymandering and 
instead argues that the freedoms of association and speech illuminate a path 
forward for clarifying the treatment of partisan gerrymandering.  In so doing, 
this Note examines the most promising attack on Vieth to date, Whitford v. 
Gill,166 which could, at long last, implement Justice Kennedy’s vision. 
A.  The Court Cannot Rely on Others to Fix the Problem 
Despite some recent promising results, some state-led 
countergerrymandering initiatives have not proven as successful as the 
California and Iowa plans.167  For example, Florida amended its constitution 
to include the following language: 
No apportionment plan or individual district shall be drawn with the intent 
to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent; and districts shall not 
be drawn with the intent or result of denying or abridging the equal 
opportunity of racial or language minorities to participate in the political 
process or to diminish their ability to elect representatives of their choice; 
and districts shall consist of contiguous territory.168 
Despite this seemingly unambiguous wording, some believe that legislators 
use private accounts to communicate with the Republican Party of Florida to 
create districts that favor incumbencies.169  Thus, even if some states can 
execute a workable gerrymandering solution without the Supreme Court, 
others are not so able. 
The Supreme Court also cannot reliably conclude that the abhorrent results 
are due solely to actions of citizens.  Although politically self-segregated 
districts may be the result of voter preference, that self-segregation plays a 
role does not mean that gerrymandering does not still occur in other 
districts.170  Additionally, even where districts are the result of political self-
segregation, cracking is a tool that can successfully dilute those densely 
populated districts.171  Moreover, that the effects of gerrymandering diminish 
 
marketplace of ideas or support a particular candidate who best represents the voters’ political 
beliefs.”). 
 166. 218 F. Supp. 3d 837 (W.D. Wis. 2016), hearing granted, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (2017) (No. 
16-1161). 
 167. See Catanese, supra note 27, at 343–45. 
 168. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 20(a). 
 169. See Catanese, supra note 27, at 345. 
 170. See supra Part I.A. 
 171. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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following the first election after realignment does not lessen the political 
fallout from initial gerrymandering.172  Rather, it means only that the impact 
of partisan gerrymandering diminishes over time, a phenomenon to be 
expected because of the mobility of the U.S. population.  Furthermore, that 
polarization in the Senate rivals that in the House of Representatives does not 
refute mathematical evidence that supports that gerrymandering directly 
alters voters’ choice of who is elected to office.173 
B.  The Roberts Court and the First Amendment in Election Cases 
The Roberts Court does not have an expansive track record of First 
Amendment cases, in part because liberal plaintiffs who would have sought 
to expand the First Amendment’s purview have been hesitant to bring 
election-related claims out of fear that the Court will make matters worse.174  
The Court has, however, substantially expanded the reach of the First 
Amendment with regard to campaign finance.  In both Davis v. FEC175 and 
Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett,176 the Court 
struck down financing plans that would have aided candidates running 
against far wealthier opponents.177  In both cases, the Court concluded that 
the First Amendment contains no guarantee of a level playing field.178  
Similarly, New York State Board of Elections v. Lopez Torres179 rejected the 
view that voters were entitled to a level playing field in the form of 
competitive elections when the Court struck down a proposal to nominate 
judges in partisan primaries.180 
In recent years, the Roberts Court appears to be softening on 
gerrymandering issues.  In addition to its holding in Arizona Independent 
Redistricting Commission, the Court held in Evenwel v. Abbott181 that states 
must draw congressional districts with populations as even as possible.  The 
Roberts Court has also ruled against a state legislature in which Republicans 
were drawing districts with a specific focus on black Democrats—a case that 
could improve the likelihood of a resolution on partisan gerrymandering.182 
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C.  The Applicability of the Association Resolution 
Were a plaintiff to bring a claim on associational grounds, even if the claim 
had merit, it may not be strong enough to persuade the Supreme Court to 
overrule Vieth.  The strongest support for an association standard is found in 
Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut.183  Justice Thurgood Marshall, 
writing for the majority, wound together the freedoms of association and 
speech and stated that “[i]t is beyond debate that freedom to engage in 
association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect 
of the liberty assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.”184  Justice Marshall 
further erased the line between the political party itself and its members when 
he stated that interference with freedom of party association is at the same 
time interference with the freedom of its devotees.185  Perhaps most strongly, 
Marshall stated, 
[T]he Constitution grants to the States a broad power to prescribe the 
“Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and 
Representatives,” which power is matched by state control over the election 
process for state offices.  But this authority does not extinguish the State’s 
responsibility to observe the limits established by the First Amendment 
rights of the State’s citizens.  The power to regulate the time, place, and 
manner of elections does not justify, without more, the abridgment of 
fundamental rights, such as the right to vote, . . . or, as here, the freedom of 
political association.186 
Although Tashjian provides some support for the freedom of association, 
it may not be strong enough.  Traditionally, the Supreme Court has reserved 
the freedom of association for cases in which a state denies an individual 
access to the electoral system.187  Additionally, the right of association may 
just be freedom of speech shrouded in different language—as Justice 
Marshall hinted at in Tashjian.  The right of association is derived from the 
need for speech in political arenas and not from any right of autonomy for 
political parties and their members.188 
D.  The Applicability of the Speech Resolution 
The most viable standard for the Supreme Court in answering the 
justiciability question of partisan gerrymandering is the First Amendment 
freedom of speech.  The idea that the government cannot quiet one person’s 
voice to promote the voices of others is ingrained in the Court’s history: 
[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of 
our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign 
to the First Amendment, which was designed “to secure the widest possible 
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dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources,” and 
“to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political 
and social changes desired by the people.”189 
This being so, it follows that partisan gerrymandering is repugnant to First 
Amendment speech. 
In New York Times v. Sullivan,190 the Supreme Court held that freedom of 
speech—especially in the political arena—has long been secured by the First 
Amendment and may well be the very reason for the First Amendment’s 
existence: 
The constitutional safeguard, we have said, “was fashioned to assure 
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social 
changes desired by the people.” . . .  “[I]t is a prized American privilege to 
speak one’s mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all public 
institutions,” . . . and this opportunity is to be afforded for “vigorous 
advocacy” no less than “abstract discussion.”191 
Given that the purpose of the First Amendment is to embolden the 
populace to express opinions contrary to the majority, it is unsurprising that 
plaintiffs have taken umbrage with partisan gerrymandering.  When districts 
are redrawn by state legislatures to dilute a segment of the population’s vote, 
the “prized American privilege” is cast aside.192 
The Court in New York Times cited Justice Brandeis’s concurring opinion 
in Whitney v. California193 to highlight the place that freedom of speech held 
in the values of the Constitution’s drafters: 
Those who won our independence believed . . . that the path of safety 
lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed 
remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.  
Believing in the power of reason as applied through public discussion, they 
eschewed silence coerced by law—the argument of force in its worst form.  
Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they 
amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be 
guaranteed.194 
This language, woven into the fabric of the Court’s discourse on freedom of 
speech, speaks rather pointedly to why partisan gerrymandering violates the 
First Amendment as it was understood at the time of ratification. 
The much-maligned decision Citizens United v. FEC195 also contains 
strong First Amendment language.  There, the more conservative Justices on 
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the Court, who have proven less amenable to the justiciability of partisan 
gerrymandering, constituted the majority.196  Justice Kennedy, writing the 
majority opinion, stated that First Amendment standards “must give the 
benefit of any doubt to protecting rather than stifling speech.”197  He further 
noted that speech is most important during a campaign for political office and 
that speech is a “precondition to enlightened self-government and a necessary 
means to protect it.”198 
Most applicable to the issue of partisan gerrymandering, Kennedy 
suggested that “the First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor 
certain subjects or viewpoints”199 and that “restrictions distinguishing among 
different speakers, allowing speech by some but not others,” are 
prohibited.200  This is exactly what partisan gerrymandering aims to achieve:  
district lines are intentionally drawn in such a manner that viewpoints in line 
with the political party of the state legislature are amplified while differing 
viewpoints are disfavored.201  This appears to be a restriction that allows 
speech by some, but not by others, as only individuals who agree with the 
state legislature are heard by their representatives.202 
Even if “disfavor of certain viewpoints” is incidental and not intentional, 
Justice Kennedy stated in Citizens United that “political speech must prevail 
against laws that would suppress it, whether by design or inadvertence.”203  
Despite being a case about campaign finance, Citizens United can be 
interpreted as a condemnation of partisan gerrymandering when juxtaposing 
the language in the majority opinion with the facts that surround many 
redistricting plans. 
E.  The Future of Gerrymandering Reform:  Gill v. Whitford 
The preceding Parts argue that there is sufficient legal support for the 
Supreme Court to adopt Justice Kennedy’s First Amendment solution to the 
problem of partisan gerrymandering.  The Court will soon announce whether 
it agrees, having heard oral arguments in Gill v. Whitford204 on October 3, 
2017, its first gerrymandering case since Arizona Independent Redistricting 
Commission.205  Originating in the Western District of Wisconsin, supporters 
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of the Democratic Party and its candidates brought suit against members of 
the Wisconsin Election Commission for employing gerrymandering 
techniques to dilute the voting power of Democrats in the state.206 
For the first time in forty years, Wisconsin elected a Republican Governor 
and a Republican majority in both the Wisconsin State Assembly and Senate.  
In the wake of this electoral success, Republican officials designed a new 
redistricting plan.207  Plaintiffs—Democratic voters and supporters—brought 
suit alleging that Republican officials used the packing and cracking 
techniques to partisan gerrymander and dilute the vote of Democrats in the 
state.208  Unlike previous plaintiffs in partisan gerrymandering cases, here 
they created a formula to measure partisan gerrymandering.209  The formula, 
called the Efficiency Gap (EG), measures the difference between the votes 
wasted by each party divided by the total number of votes.210  The party with 
the favorable EG result wastes fewer votes and thus is able to better utilize 
its share of the total votes to populate legislative seats.211 
The plaintiffs used the EG measure to articulate a standard they felt would 
be workable for the court.212  Under the proposed standard, which would 
create a presumption of unconstitutionality, plaintiffs must (1) establish state 
intent to partisan gerrymander and (2) prove, via EG, a partisan effect above 
a specified threshold.213  If the plaintiff meets the above evidentiary 
threshold, then the defendant would have to rebut the presumption by 
showing a legitimate state policy or an underlying political geography 
explaining the problematic EG result.214 
In Whitford, the district court drew heavily upon pre-Vieth Supreme Court 
rulings.  After outlining the long history of partisan gerrymandering cases 
heard by the Court, Judge Kenneth Ripple stated explicitly that “[i]t is clear 
that the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause protect a citizen 
against state discrimination as to the weight of his or her vote when that 
discrimination is based on the political preferences of the voter.”215  
Furthermore, Judge Ripple elucidated that both the First Amendment and the 
Equal Protection Clause “prohibit a redistricting scheme which (1) is 
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intended to place a severe impediment on the effectiveness of the votes of 
individual citizens on the basis of their political affiliation, (2) has that effect, 
and (3) cannot be justified on other, legitimate legislative grounds.”216 
According to Judge Ripple, discriminatory intent with regard to a 
redistricting plan involves an intent to entrench a political party in power 
because it then impinges upon representational rights.217  The evidence at 
trial showed that drafters of the district maps in Wisconsin were concerned 
with the “durability” of their plan, which meant securing a Republican 
majority in the assembly under any likely future scenario.218 
The evidence offered also made clear to Judge Ripple that the 
discriminatory effect was achieved.  Among other factors, Judge Ripple 
pointed to the fact that in 2012, Republicans garnered merely 48.6 percent of 
the vote, yet they secured sixty seats.219  In the subsequent 2014 election, 
Republicans achieved 52 percent of the vote but a disproportionate sixty-
three seats.220  Thus, when Democrats achieved nearly the same percentage 
of the vote as Republicans (51.4 percent compared to 52 percent), the number 
of seats achieved by the parties differed by twenty-four.221  The evidence in 
Whitford overcomes the problems presented in Bandemer, namely that there 
are now multiple elections included in the data—not just one—and that a few 
extra percentage points for one party would not definitively swing the 
majority in the assembly.222  Although the Constitution does not require 
proportionality, Judge Ripple’s opinion demonstrates that courts are not 
barred from considering the ratio of votes to seats to find highly “dis 
proportional” representation.223 
Finally, Judge Ripple cited Justice Kennedy’s Vieth concurrence to argue 
that gerrymandering that is unrelated to any legitimate legislative objective 
is unconstitutional.224  The defendants attempted to show that the disparate 
results in the election were due to the geography of voters in Wisconsin,225 
but Judge Ripple was unconvinced and concluded instead that the 
discrepancy was due to the specific districting plan being contested.226 
Judge Ripple’s analysis was seemingly crafted with an eye toward 
overcoming the Vieth hurdle and achieving approval of a majority of the 
Supreme Court.  By declining to enunciate a numerical line for what is 
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acceptable, opting instead to highlight when a majority will persist despite 
reasonable swings in votes, Judge Ripple evaded the indeterminacy problem 
that felled Bandemer in the eyes of the Vieth plurality.227  Additionally, the 
language “under any likely future electoral scenario for the remainder of the 
decade,”228 despite not providing a clear answer to all future gerrymandering 
questions, still allows future courts to identify exactly what the test is and 
when the test fails.229  The efficacy of Judge Ripple’s attack on Vieth will be 
known in the coming months when the Supreme Court issues a decision on 
Whitford. 
CONCLUSION 
Given the recent trends of the Court, the time is ripe for a majority 
resolution concerning partisan gerrymandering.  Justice Kennedy’s 
suggestion in his Vieth concurrence that the First Amendment is the standard 
by which the Supreme Court may find partisan gerrymandering justiciable 
was unsupported by any of his fellow Justices.230  Nevertheless, there is 
Supreme Court precedent regarding the First Amendment that refutes Justice 
Scalia’s Vieth claim that there can be no workable standard to make partisan 
gerrymandering justiciable.231 
The First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech has long been 
considered most sacred when used with regard to political speech.232  
Although the Court has not explicitly characterized voting as speech, there is 
ample support for such a characterization in other Supreme Court rulings.233  
Justice Kennedy’s siding with the liberal wing of the Court in Arizona 
Independent Redistricting Commission makes it likely that the votes exist to 
make partisan gerrymandering justiciable once Whitford is decided.234 
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